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port will be forever barred. Therefore, the wife who has valid grounds
for absolute divorce is forced to bring suit for alimony before suing for
divorce if she desires both. The effect of the Beeson decision, then, is
dearly consistent with general policy for it enhances the wife's chances
of getting an alimony decree before final adjudication of her husband's
divorce action. Nevertheless, it is true that Beeson does violence to
the equally sound principles of avoiding piecemeal litigation and of
preventing a multiplicity of suits which frequently result in conflicting
verdicts based upon substantially the same evidence.' 8
It is unlikely that the Beeson case will undermine Cameron v. Cameron, since the two cases are factually distinguishable. Furthermore the
Beeson decision is based upon a statutory interpretation of G.S. § 50-16.
The decision adds further weight to the contention that North Carolina
should amend its divorce laws in order to permit a wife who has valid
grounds for divorce to obtain her absolute divorce and alimony by either
suing for both in the same action or by means of a counterclaim in any
action instituted by her husband. 19
JAmES N. GOLDING

Evidence-Opinion Testimony of Speed
In Fleming v. Twiggs,' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
a witness's testimony that the defendant's car was traveling seventy
miles per hour when it struck the plaintiff was inadmissible because the
witness had not had sufficient opportunity to form an opinion of probative
value. The witness had heard the sound of brakes and looked back to
see defendant's car just before it struck the deceased. She then turned
her head away so as not to see the accident. The court stated: "When
a witness has had no reasonable opportunity to judge speed of an auto'2
mobile, it is error to permit him to testify in regard thereto.
The above language was quoted from State v. Becker,3 where the
witness testified that she had first seen the car that struck her when it
was fifteen feet away, and that it was going fifty-five miles per hour.
There was other undisputed evidence that the car stopped twenty-five
feet after it hit the witness. The court rejected the estimate of speed,
saying that it would have been a physical impossibility for the defendant
to have stopped his car in so short a distance if at the time in question
it was traveling at such a rate of speed. However, this was a criminal
action, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and not only was
' 8 Emry v. Chappell, 148 N.C. 327, 330, 62 S.E. 411, 412 (1908).
See note 14 supra.

'244 N.C. 666, 94 S.E.2d 821 (1956).
Id.at 669, 94 S.E.2d at 824.
S241 N.C. 321, 327, 85 S.E.2d 327, 331 (1955).
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there no other evidence to support the witness's testimony, but there
was evidence which contradicted it. Still the case seems to have
enunciated a North Carolina rule that when the observation was very
limited, the witness should not be permitted to give his opinion as to
the speed of the vehicle; and, if admitted, it will be considered of no
probative value.
There is some conflict among the states which have ruled on the
point of opinion testimony as to vehicular speed based on limited observation. California4 and Missouri5 have gone to the extreme by admitting
testimony of witnesses who saw the vehicle in motion for a distance of
only five feet, and by allowing the jury to -make a finding as to speed
'based on this testimony alone. The Missouri court said, "The weight of
that testimony was for the jury after having the benefit of plaintiff's
An Alabama court allowed testicross-examination on the subject."
mony of a witness as to the speed of a vehicle which he saw "just before"
it hit him and "just afterward," saying that the extent of the observation
went to the weight of the testimony and not to its admissibility. 7
Kansas,8 Kentucky,9 and Texas, 10 have allowed the witness to testify
where his opportunity to observe was only slightly greater. In the
Kentucky case," however, there was corroborating evidence.
When the witness has seen the vehicle in motion for only fifteen
feet or less, most courts either will not allow him to testify as to the
speed of the vehicle or will not allow the jury to make a finding as to
speed based on this evidence alone.12 The Wisconsin court allowed a witness to testify that he had first seen the automobile which struck him
when it was thirty to thirty-five feet away and that in his opinion it was
traveling sixty-five to seventy miles per hour;13 the same court had
'Schwenger

v. Gaither, 87 Cal. App. 2d 913, 198 P.2d 108 (1948)

(witness

estimated speed to be forty miles per hour).
Johnson v. Cox, 262 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1953) (witness estimated speed to be
fift miles per hour). See also Nixon v. Hill, 52 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. 1932).
Johnson v. Cox, mipra note 5, at 15.
'Jack Cole, Inc. v. Walker, 240 Ala. 683, 200 So. 2d 768 (1941).
8 Himmelwright v. Baker, 82 Kan. 569, 109 Pac. 178 (1910) (plaintiff saw the
automobile ten or fifteen feet away and testified that it was traveling fifteen miles
per hour).
'Eubank v. Austin, 288 S.W.2d 358 (Ky. 1956) (witness testified he saw the
motorcycle when it was fifteen or twenty feet away and that it was traveling
per hour).
fifty-five
or sixtyv.miles
10 Humphries
Louisiana
Ry. and Irrigation Co., 291 S.W. 1094 (Tex.
Civ.

App. 1927), in which the court allowed a witness who had first seen the train
when it was fifteen or twenty feet away to testify that in his opinion it was
traveling twenty-five miles per hour, and allowed the issue of speed to go to the
jury on this evidence alone. See Note,' 1 BAYLOR L. Ray. 482 (1949).
1

Eubank v. Austin, 288 S.W.2d 358 (Ky. 1956).
" Baker v. Shockey, 92 Ga. App. 443, 88 S.E.2d 741 (1955) ; Wiles v. Connor
Coal and Wood Co., 143 Me. 250, 60 A.2d 786 (1948) ; Davidson v. Beacon Hill
Taxi Service, 278 Mass. 540, 180 N.E. 503 (1932); Kelly v. Veneziale, 348 Pa.
325, 35 A.2d 67 (1944) ; Culver v. Webb, 244 Wis. 478, 12 N.W.2d 731 (1944).
Pestotnik v.
13 Albrecht v. Tradewell, 271 Wis. 303, 73 N.W.2d 408 (1955).
Balliet, 233 Iowa 1047, 10 N.W.2d 99 (1943), also allowed a witness who had seen
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stated in an earlier case, in which a witness saw a car 700 to 800 feet
away and then did not look again until the car was fifteen feet from him,
that "It is inconceivable that he could make a useful estimate from a
14
fleeting glance a split second before the cars collided.1
In rejecting the witness's estimate of speed because he only saw the
vehicle in motion for a split second, the court must implicitly accept his
estimate of the speed of the vehicle and the distance which he stated he
saw it travel for the purpose of determining that he saw it for only a
split second.15 Moreover, when the court rejects the estimate of speed
merely because the witness testifies that he only saw the vehicle in
motion for a distance of ten or fifteen feet, it is accepting as accurate the
witness's estimate of the distance which he saw the vehicle travel, but
is refusing to accept his estimate of its speed. Sometimes there is evidence to support the distance, such as where the witness was not able
to see the car until it emerged from behind a building. In such a case
the distance from where the witness could first see a car beyond the
building to the point of impact could be measured. 6 Often the estimate
of the distance is unsupported by other evidence and is an estimate of
a witness who only saw the vehicle coming directly toward him, yet the
courts seem to accept it as accurate in determining whether the witness
had sufficient opportunity to judge the vehicle's speed. Why should the
jury not be allowed to find that the witness observed the vehicle in motion
for a greater distance, i.e., that he erred in his estimate of distance and
not of speed, and, therefore, that he had seen the vehicle in motion for a
distance great enough to give probative value to his estimate of speed?
Michigan has made a distinction as to whether the witness saw the
vehicle from a side view or coming directly toward him. A witness in
each of two Michigan cases had seen the car in motion for a distance of
twenty feet, but the court rejected the testimony of the one who had
seen the automobile coming directly toward him, 17 and allowed the
testimony of the other, a railroad engineer of long experience who had
seen the moving automobile from a side view.18 However, the court in
the latter case expressly took into consideration the fact that it was the
aspeed.
vehicle in motion for a distance of thirty feet to testify as to his estimate of its
14 Culver v. Webb, 244 Wis. 478, 485, 12 N.W.2d
731, 734 (1944).
" In Johnson v. Cox, 262 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1953), the court calculated that if,
as the witness testified, she saw the motorcycle when it was five feet away and it
was traveling forty-five to fifty miles per hour, then she saw it for only onesixteenth to one-eighteenth of a second. In State v. Baker, 241 N.C. 321, 85 S.E.2d
327 (1955), the court calculated that if the car were traveling fifty-five miles per
hour, it was traveling eighty-one feet per second, and a witness who saw it for a
distance of fifteen feet only was not allowed to give his estimate of its speed.

" See Jackson v. Leach, 160 Md. 139, 152 A.2d 813 (1931).

"Wright v. Crane, 142 Mich. 508, 106 N.W. 71 (1905).
Harnau v. Haight, 189 Mich. 600, 155 N.W. 563 (1915).
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witness's business to estimate vehicular speeds. Maryland has allowed
the testimony of a witness who, from a side view, had seen the vehicle
in motion for a distance of twenty-six feet, 19 while Pennsylvania rejected the testimony of a witness who first saw the train which hit him
when it was twenty-five feet away. 20 Thus it seems that when the witness has seen the vehicle in motion for a distance of only twenty or
twenty-five feet, some courts will inquire into further circumstances before determining whether the witness had sufficient opportunity to form
an opinion as to the speed of the vehicle.
The Arizona court has stated, "We think that the correct rule is
that if there is any possibility the opinion has evidentiary value, however
slight, the trial court should not be reversed for admitting it." 21
Georgia has held that opinion evidence as to speed based on a momentary view, though admissible, was not sufficient evidence to furnish a
basis on which a jury could find the automobile's speed ;22 and the
Nebraska court stated, "In the final analysis it resolves itself into a
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict, rather
than the competency of the witness to testify."' 2- This view, salvages the
corroborative value of evidence too weak, as a matter of law, to alone
support a verdict. The Pennsylvania court stated the proposition in
this fashion:
There is no rule of law whereof we are aware, that excludes
opinion evidence as to speed if the witness presents the requisite
qualifications, viz., an observation of the vehicular movement ....
The weight attributable to such testimony may ... be very slight
and even legally insufficient to carry the point for which offered.
Indeed if it is the sole evidence of the operative negligence alleged,
it may be legally insufficient to support an affirmative finding...
or its weight may be so negligible as to justify its practical exclusion from the jury's consideration . ... 24
Though a witness may have seen the vehicle for only a short distance
before the collision, he may have seen or felt its impact and observed
the distance it traveled after the collision. Such a witness's opinion as
to the speed of the vehicle might be helpful to the jury if it tends to
corroborate other competent evidence of speed. However, if there is
Jackson v. Leach, 160 Md. 139, 152 A.2d 813 (1931).
'o Ealy v. New York Cent. R.R., 333 Pa. 471, 5 A.2d 110 (1939).
" Eldredge v. Miller, 78 Ariz. 140, 145, 277 P.2d 239, 242 (1955).
" Baker v. Shockey, 92 Ga. App. 443, 88 S.E.2d 741 (1955) (plaintiff testified
that he saw the automobile about ten or fifteen feet before it struck him and that
it was going fifty miles per hour) ; Allen v. Hatchet, 91 Ga. App. 571, 86 S.E.2d
662 (1955) (plaintiff testified that he saw the automobile one or two seconds before
it hit him and that it was traveling seventy miles per hour).
24

Carnes v. DeKlotz, 137 Neb. 787, 789, 291 N.W. 490, 492 (1940).
Shaffer v. Torrens, 359 Pa. 187, 193, 58 A.2d 439, 442 (1948).
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no other competent evidence to support the witness's testimony the trial
judge could refuse to permit the witness to testify as to his opinion of
the speed of the vehicle when it alone would not be sufficient evidence
on which the jury could base a finding of speed.
Neither of the two previously discussed North Carolina cases 26
specifically stated that such opinion testimony could not be used to
corroborate other evidence, but from the language of those two cases
it would seem that North Carolina might altogether reject such evidence. 26 Yet in State v. Fentress,27 the North Carolina court allowed a
witness who did not see the automobile in motion or the accident to
testify that in his opinion the car was traveling eighty-five miles per
hour, based on the sound of the engine and the loud crash. The court
stated: "The evidence of Foster who testified that he heard the car
passing with a great noise and at a rapid rate of speed does not lack
circumstantial support, since its roaring progress stopped with a loud
crash at the point where he found it a moment later, torn to pieces and
'28
its occupants lying on the ground about the wreck."
Would not one who actually sees the vehicle in motion and the
collision have a better opportunity to judge the speed of the vehicle than
one who only hears the sound of the motor and the following crash?
It seems that when there is other competent evidence to support a
witness's opinion as to the speed of a vehicle, the jury should be allowed
to hear such opinion unless the witness's observation was so limited that
his opinion is totally lacking in probative value.
ROBERT L. GRUBB, JR.
Evidence-Privileged Governmental RecordsProduction and Examination by Trial Judge
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jencks
v. United States1 has caused a great deal of criticism and controversy.
This Note will be limited to evidentiary questions concerning privileged
governmental records, their production, and examination of them by
See text at notes 1 and 2 supra.

But see Jones v. Bagwell, 207 N.C. 378, 177 S.E. 170 (1934), where witnesses
who testified that they saw the automobile immediately after it struck deceased and
while it was coming to a stop were allowed to testify that in their opinion the
automobile was traveling thirty to forty miles per hour when they saw it for the
purpose of inferentially showing a greater speed at the time of impact, and in
corroboration of other evidence.
2 230 N.C. 248, 52 S.E2d 795 (1949).
28Id. at 251, 52 S.E.2d at 797. But see Tyndall v. Hines Co., 226 N.C. 620,
623, 39 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1946), where the court stated: "Conversely, one who did
not see a vehicle in motion will not be permitted to give an opinion as to its speed.
The opinion must be a fact observed." In Campbell v. Sargent, 186 Minn. 293,
299, 243 N.W. 142, 144 (1932), it was stated: "We do not know of any way by
which one can determine the speed of a car by the noise."
1353 U.S. 657 (1957).
2

